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Microeconomics, Norms, and Rationality* 
Alexander James Field 
University of Santa Clara 
I. Introduction 
A divergence of views among microeconomists in general and game 
theorists in particular regarding the explanatory objectives of micro-
economic theory has become apparent in recent years. This divergence 
concerns, most fundamentally, the question whether institutions, legal 
or customary rules, or social norms are to be classified among the 
endogenous as opposed to the exogenous variables in the framework of 
microeconomic analysis. 1 The majority of economists are probably 
agnostic or ambivalent on this question, not having confronted, or not 
having had to confront, the issue in their own work. Many have side-
stepped it by treating institutions as immutable or by restricting their 
analyses to a given rule regime. But rules do vary and change, and 
among those who are concerned with studying variation in institutions, 
two diverging views are increasingly identifiable, sometimes coexisting 
even within the writings of the same author. 
The first sees game theory (and microeconomic theory in general) 
as an analytical device useful for considering the comparative incentive 
features of (and corresponding outcomes associated with) different in-
stitutional regimes, regimes that might be changed in one's capacity as 
a policymaker or that have varied in fact as the result of differential 
historical development in different regions. The second position ac-
cepts this statement of the objectives of microeconomic theory vis-a-
vis institutions for the short run but takes it as the ultimate task of 
microeconomic and game theory to provide a dynamic theory of the 
origin, persistence, and change of institutions, using a model that does 
not make appeal to "ad hoc" exogenously specified rules or norms. 
This second position greatly expands the scope of microeconomic 
analysis and makes work consistent with the first position seem limited 
by comparison. Whereas the first approach concerns itself only with 
the consequences of institutional variation, the second addresses 
causes as well. Theoretical frameworks must nevertheless be judged 
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not only according to what they promise but also according to what 
they deliver. Work consistent with the second position has not, by and 
large, delivered what it has promised. 2 This paper investigates some of 
the reasons why this has been true. In particular, it is argued that if one 
accepts the second position in its extreme form, 3 the analytical struc-
ture of microeconomic theory begins to unravel, in the sense that one is 
left with no consistent explanation of why the world does not degener-
ate into a war of all against all. 
An implication of this paper is that the contribution microeco-
nomic theory offers to the analysis of institutional variation lies primar-
ily in work consistent with the first position: comparative exercises 
where rules are varied and the impact on endogenous variables (such 
as output and prices) is investigated, but where adherence to basic 
rules in each of the cases compared is taken as given or as accounted 
for by forces outside the model.4 The more limited objective of work 
consistent with this first view, that is, the absence in such work of a 
general theory of the causes of institutional variation, does not neces-
sarily render it deficient any more than the absence in economic theory 
of explanations for the origin, persistence, and possible change of indi-
vidual preferences should necessarily be viewed as a deficiency of such 
theory. In any social scientific model, defining what is not to be ex-
plained is an essential part of delineating what is to be explained. 
A common critical approach to microeconomic theory has been to 
accept the proposition that the theory embodies a methodological indi-
vidualist approach in an extreme form and then to criticize or reject 
methodological individualism and thus, derivatively, microeconomic 
theory. 5 This paper adopts a different strategy and suggests that the 
problem lies not so much with the "true" structure of the theory, but 
rather with the perception of its structure. 6 Markets require and pre-
suppose certain fundamental relations of predictability in the actions of 
economic agents, which can be thought of as the constitutive rules of 
the market. These rules form part of the description of a market game. 
Although they may change (for reasons understood imperfectly), they 
cannot, or at least all of them cannot, usefully be thought of as arising 
as the result of previous plays of the game in which they did not 
prevail. The rules of any game-"cooperative" or "noncooperative" 
(these terms have very specific meanings in game theory)-define both 
what can be varied in pursuit of one's interest and what cannot. The 
outcome of a "noncooperative" chess game and the particular se-
quence of moves leading up to it are not specified in advance; the rules 
do, however, constrain the movements of various pieces. Similarly, 
neither the outcome nor the entire sequence of actions in a market 
game is specified in detail by its rules. Nevertheless, the assumption of 
privately owned endowments does form part of the description of the 
game, as do the prohibitions against theft and fraud. In any persisting 
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market game, whether interpreted as a cooperative or a noncoopera-
tive game, the fundamental legal and customary rules that define it are 
not subject to bargaining, in the sense that at least a large fraction of 
individual agents exclude from consideration the option of failing to 
abide by such rules as part of the range of possibilities open to them for 
improving their welfare. In other words, these rules confront individ-
uals as one contributor to the constraints they face, constraints also 
influenced by technologies, endowments, preferences, and the deci-
sions of others. Why agents rule out such possibilities for rule violation 
is an important question, but such behavior does not necessarily follow 
from the kind of instrumental means-end calculations assumed to take 
place within these rules. 
It is not material for the purposes of this essay whether these rules 
are actually perceived as such, nor does this essay take a position on 
whether these rules or structures have their origin in genetic endow-
ments, as the sociobiologists would have it, or are viewed as culturally 
or historically given, or represent a particularly human capability 
voluntarily to recognize imperatives of moral obligation. But the as-
sumption that some system of rules, norms, or structures persists is an 
analytical necessity if microeconomic theory or game theory is to be 
undertaken within the empirical context of stable political and social 
orders. The structure of the logical argument in favor of this proposi-
tion might be called, instead of reductio ad absurdum, reductio ad 
anarchia. It consists, in its barest form, of the following syllogism: 
PROPOSITION 1: If one views the world as consisting of self-
interested agents unconstrained by rules or norms, or norm-like phe-
nomena, there exists no explanation for why the world does not degen-
erate into a Hobbesian war of all against all. 
PROPOSITION 2: One frequently observes stable social existence. 
CONCLUSION: If the behavioral principle of social science models is 
to be self-interest maximization, and one wishes to model stable social 
orders, one must posit logically anterior rules or norms that help define 
the constraints and, thus, the arena within which such maximization 
takes place. 7 
Not all economists accept this argument. At his most polemical, 
Gary Becker clearly disagrees: 
. . . economists cannot resist the temptation to hide their own lack of 
understanding behind allegations of irrational behavior, unnecessary ig-
norance, folly, ad hoc shifts in values, and the like, which is simply 
acknowledging defeat under the guise of considered judgment. . . . 
Naturally, what is tempting to economists nominally committed to the 
economics approach becomes irresistible to others without a commit-
ment to the scientific study of sociology, psychology or anthropology. 
With an ingenuity worthy of admiration if put to better use, almost any 
conceivable behavior is alleged to be dominated by ignorance and irra-
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tionality, values and their frequent unexplained shifts, custom and tradi-
tion, the compliance somehow induced by social norms or the ego and 
the id.8 
An example suggested by Becker of the type of explanation emanating 
from those who lack "a commitment to scientific study" is the claim 
that "businessmen talk about the social responsibilities of business 
because their attitudes are said to be influenced by public discussions 
rather than because such talk is necessary to maximize their profits 
given the climate of public interventionism. " 9 To the extent that "so-
cial responsibility" encompasses adhering to corporate codes of eth-
ics, Becker directly questions the sincerity of statements such as the 
following from David Rockefeller in an issue of the Hofstra Law Re-
view: 
A moral foundation is imperative in a free society that affords each 
individual the latitude for independent thought and action. Without ethi-
cal values a free society would become a jungle .... Ethical principles 
are the glue that holds a business system of free enterprise together. 
Business runs on mutual trust and confidence that others will live up to 
their word. The marketplace, which is the heart of a human society, 
could not exist without it. 10 
There is no a priori reason to believe that this statement, which 
accompanied a call for adherence to corporate codes of ethics, reflects, 
as Becker would have it, the individual profit-maximizing strategy. 
Adherence to ethical norms may be "reasonable" and socially desir-
able, but it does not necessarily follow from instrumental means-ends 
calculations. Some businessmen and economists view statements such 
as Rockefeller's (whether accompanied by adherence or not) as repre-
senting appeasement of naive or malevolent reformers, and argue that 
the only good defense against such reformers is a good offense in which 
the need for corporate codes of ethics is denied: that strategy indeed, 
tends increasingly to dominate discussion. 11 Justifying rule violation 
(e.g., bribery) on the grounds that it is an "efficient" solution (both the 
briber and the bribee are made better oft), many businessmen and 
professionals neglect or deny responsibility for the corrosive effect of 
such behavior in the aggregate on adherence to the Rule of Law. 12 As 
will become apparent, it is difficult to counter such conclusions with 
arguments that stress only the self-interest of the individuals involved. 
Nevertheless, Becker seems to deny on a priori grounds the possibility 
that Rockefeller might mean what he says-that there can be such a 
thing, as Charles Fried puts it, as a "moral cause." 13 
In addition to questioning the sincerity of businessmen who might 
publicly support corporate codes of ethics, Becker comes close to 
attacking the scholarly integrity of those who, for example, might at-
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tribute compliance to rules as in part the result of adherence to social 
norms. But in a more restrained passage of the work quoted above 
Becker identifies the economic approach with three key assumptions: 
(a) the assumption of maximizing behavior, (b) the assumption that 
markets exist, and (c) the assumption that individuals have stable pref-
erences over the psycho-physiological states induced by consumption 
of goods and services, preferences which do not differ substantially 
across social class or region. 14 The second assumption is the most 
interesting from the standpoint of this paper. If by assuming that "mar-
kets exist" Becker takes as given adherence to the fundamental legal 
or customary framework within which exchanges take place, then very 
little separates his position from that advanced here. But what ensures 
compliance with these rules in his model?15 As the quoted passage 
indicates, he is disdainful of any explanation that relies on adherence to 
norms. Since much of Becker's work appears to involve the applica-
tion of strictly individualistic cost-benefit calculations to behavior one 
might otherwise believe to be constrained, at least in part, by rules or 
norms, there is an obvious tension in Becker's analysis between posi-
tions 1 and 2. This tension is observable, as will become apparent, also 
in the writings of Walras and of some game theorists today. 
John Harsanyi, for example, in criticizing the work of Talcott 
Parsons, argues that "social norms should not be used as basic explan-
atory variables in analyzing social behavior, but rather should be them-
selves explained in terms of peoples' individual objectives and inter-
ests. " 16 A number of game theorists, rising to this challenge and 
recognizing what is taken for granted in the assumption of a "coopera-
tive" game, now see the task of game theory to be the demonstration of 
how "cooperative" games are the outcomes of, or are embedded in, 
"noncooperative" games. Two objections can be raised against this 
line of attack, insofar as it is designed to produce a theory of social 
organization that avoids reference to culturally or genetically deter-
mined norms. First, even "noncooperative" games contain, as part of 
their description, certain rules adherence to which is assumed as part 
of the analysis. Although additional cooperation is precluded by the 
assumption that the game is "noncooperative," the very fact that in-
teraction can be described and perceived as a game is evidence of a 
rudimentary structure of interaction. Chess is not described by game 
theorists as a cooperative game; certain moves are, nevertheless, con-
sidered to be "illegal." Pocketing one's opponent's rook when it 
threatens one's queen may dramatically improve one's chances of win-
ning, but is ruled out of discussion in considerations of chess strategy. 
Second, a common theoretical device in the attempt to derive 
"cooperative outcomes" from "noncooperative" games has been to 
assume that the noncooperative game is repeated. 17 Is it not just as ad 
hoc to assume, without explanation, that a game is repeated, as it is to 
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assume that binding (enforceable) contracts can be entered into while it 
is being played (one of the key distinguishing features of "coopera-
tive" games)? Yet some game theorists appear to deny this. 
If Becker, Harsanyi, and others with similar views are correct, the 
work of microeconomic theorists for the next couple of decades is cut 
out. The task must be to show how phenomena previously explained as 
the result of nonrational behavior or the operation of such ad hoc 
devices as social norms in fact result from the rational interaction of 
freely choosing self-interested individuals unconstrained by such 
norms. If the constraining influence of rules or laws, at least in the 
short run, is to be granted (and it is hard not to do this) then the choice 
of these rules or laws as opposed to others is what must be explained as 
the result of interacting, freely choosing individuals. A great deal of 
recent work in microeconomic theory has been motivated by such 
methodological objectives, and this research program is increasingly 
attractive to a minority in such noneconomic disciplines as political 
science, sociology, psychology, anthropology, and philosophy. 18 
This paper argues that not only preferences, technologies, and 
endowments, but also certain additional exogenous variables, need to 
be taken as given within the framework of microeconomic analysis. 
Among these are language and the human predisposition (whether ge-
netically, culturally, or individualistically explained) to adhere to law 
or custom when others do so, even when there are individual incen-
tives to do otherwise. In a limited number of cases involving regulative 
rules, game theory suggests how the existence of shared language and 
the possibility of communication could explain why some rather than 
others of a set of possible norms or rules have emerged. But interagent 
communication is only part of what distinguishes political order from 
political chaos and only part of what, in game-theory terms, distin-
guishes a "cooperative" from a "noncooperative" game. The ability 
to make binding contracts in a cooperative game is at least equally 
important in distinguishing it from a noncooperative one. The capabil-
ity and willingness to make such contracts presuppose agreement on a 
more fundamental set of rules, and the assumption of interagent com-
munication alone cannot account for why or how the norms or rules 
making possible such agreements emerge or are selected. 
II. Microeconomics, Game Theory, and Norms 
Microeconomic theory has traditionally been subdivided into a theory 
of nonstrategic interaction, the theory of general competitive equilib-
rium in a market economy first developed in its modern form by Leon 
Walras, and a theory of strategic interaction, 19 a subset of the theory of 
games developed initially by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgen-
stern.20 In the Walrasian model, no one agent believes that varying the 
quantity of any output or input individually demanded or supplied will 
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affect prices or quantities for the system as a whole. Walras captured 
this aspect of a market economy by assuming that agents placed their 
orders after hearing an announced price vector that they could not 
alter, although no actual trades were to take place until an equilibrium 
vector was found. Total excess demands and supplies for the economy 
guided the auctioneer through a sequence of announced price vectors 
and orders as the system "groped" toward an equilibrium price vector, 
at which these excess demands and supplies were eliminated. Through 
the metaphor of the auctioneer and tatonnement, Walras was able both 
to have prices confront the individual as external and beyond influence 
and in the aggregate to have them reflect the joint desires and capabili-
ties of the collectivity. The theory of strategic interaction, by contrast, 
has been concerned with the examination of behavior and outcomes in 
situations (such as an oligopolistic noncompetitive market) where one 
agent's actions may directly depend on and in turn influence the ac-
tions and payoffs of other agents. 
In recent years the competitive/game-theoretic, nonstrategic/ 
strategic-interaction dichotomies have become less distinct as an en-
tirely different (non-Walrasian) approach to competitive equilibrium 
has developed. This approach stems from the work of Francis 
Edgeworth and embodies the assumption that final allocations are 
reached as the result of bargaining over quantities within the context of 
a cooperative game, that is, a game in which direct communication is 
possible and players can make "binding" contracts among them-
selves. Edgeworth originally analyzed a two-person, two-good bar-
gaining game, each player endowed with certain quantities of each 
good and having preference orderings over them. 21 He demonstrated 
that there usually exists a set of possible trades that share the attributes 
(a) that each player is not made worse off than in the absence of trade 
and (b) that there are no trades more beneficial to both. This core of an 
exchange economy has been more formally defined as redistributions 
of the total endowment that no group of agents ( or single agent in a 
two-person game) can improve upon. 22 Edgeworth also showed that if 
one increases the numbers of the two types of players (with identical 
endowments and preferences within each type), the core of this ex-
change economy would shrink to the Walrasian equilibrium (or equilib-
ria, if nonunique). 23 That is, in the unique equilibrium case, the ex-
changes that take place in the Edgeworth scheme will be identical to 
those induced by the Walrasian equilibrium price vector. 
About the existence both of language and of a normative legal or 
customary structure in the Edgeworthian story there can be no doubt, 
because it models a competitive exchange economy as a cooperative 
game.24 The two most important features which definitionally distin-
guish "cooperative" from "noncooperative" games are (1) the possi-
bility of interagent communication and (2) the assumption that binding 
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(i.e., enforceable) contracts can be made. 25 As soon as one assumes 
that one is operating within a "cooperative" game, two of the most 
fundamental prerequisites of social organization-shared language and 
the enforceability of agreements where there are incentives to viola-
tion-have been taken as givens: their origins, perforce, cannot be 
elucidated by analysis of the process or outcome of a cooperative game. 
Obviously, one also needs a shared language in the Walrasian 
story. But the status of legal or customary rules in the Walrasian ver-
sion is more problematic. Werner Hildebrand terms the Walrasian 
equilibrium concept "noncooperative, " 26 distinguishing it from the 
"cooperative" core concept, but this does not satisfactorily dispose of 
the issue. Walras himself was unclear about the analytical status of 
institutions or rules in his model, although there are passages that 
unambiguously demonstrate that he assumed four categories of exoge-
nous variables in his system: tastes, technologies, endowments, and 
rules. 27 Logically, this seems the only way to make sense of the ap-
paratus of the auctioneer and the implicit assumption of privately 
owned endowments. In Foundations of Economic Analysis, Paul 
Samuelson recognizes the importance of this fourth category of exoge-
nous variable, 28 but in several other important expositions institutions 
get remarkably little emphasis. Bent Hansen, for example, fails to 
mention institutions or rules in his Survey of General Equilibrium Sys-
tems :29 there is no entry in the index for anything even vaguely related 
to these concepts. Government appears only late in the book, when 
money is introduced, and then only as the agency that fixes the stock of 
this commodity. A reader may emerge from such expositions with a 
less than clear understanding of the importance (or at a minimum, the 
debate over the importance) of exogenously specified rules, norms, or 
institutions in determining (along with tastes, technologies, and endow-
ments) a general equilibrium. A similar neglect is evident in Gerard 
Debreu's Theory of Value. 30 
One of the often emphasized advantages of the limited rules asso-
ciated with a Walrasian competitive economy has been its purported 
economizing both on rule formation and on transactions costs of ex-
change. The existence of a universally known price vector avoids the 
complicated higgling and haggling of an N-person Edgeworth economy 
or the elaborate and specific rules necessary in a command economy 
undertaking reallocation ofresources by central directive. Moreover, if 
endowments or technologies change (creating disequilibria in the form 
of excess demands of supplies), information concerning the needed 
direction of quantity adjustment is "automatically" communicated to 
all market participants through variation in the price vector, enabling 
individuals to coordinate their plans so as to avoid unfilled demands or 
unsold output. 
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An example can illustrate the posited adjustment mechanisms. 
Suppose an economy to consist of only two regions (agents). In the first 
instance, each region places demands and offers supplies according to 
a pattern which corresponds to self-sufficiency. A new transport tech-
nology now becomes available, drastically lowering the cost of trans-
portation between the two regions. Markets will no longer clear at the 
previous price levels, and excess supplies will show up at previously 
equilibrating input prices and (region-specific) output prices. The auc-
tioneer will grope for a new equilibrium by offering a slightly different 
set of prices, with lower region-specific output prices for the affected 
commodities. Given different regional endowments, the adjustment to 
a new interregional regime of specialization will be automatically coor-
dinated by the change in the equilibrium price vector. 
The automaticity of this market adjustment process, however, de-
pends on the auctioneer, on the mutually agreed-on respect for pri-
vately owned endowments, and on the fulfillment of promises to supply 
certain amounts of such endowments at certain prices. The fact that 
the Walrasian market game involves a solution concept that is in strict 
game-theoretic terms "noncooperative" does not mean that it is a 
game played without rules any more than the fact that chess is a "non-
cooperative" game means that one can ignore its rules in understand-
ing or predicting its sequence of moves. 
In discussions of market interaction, where the basic constitutive 
rules of the market are presupposed, it is not usually necessary to make 
explicit reference to the concept of rules or norms in explaining why 
the game ends as it does: one need only appeal to individuals pursuing 
their own self-interests given the structure of the situation as it is 
presented to them. But the outcomes "explained" using these models 
are just as conditional on the basic rules of the game as they are on 
technologies, preferences, endowments, or the behavioral assumption 
of utility or profit maximization. There is nothing mystical about the 
coordination capabilities of a market: those capabilities inhere in its 
rules. 
To what degree, however, can the analytical techniques of game 
theory be used to explain why certain rule structures prevail rather 
than others? That is, do observed rules tend to represent "efficient" 
solutions to problems presented by prevailing resource, preference, 
and technological environments? A response to this question requires 
some subtle distinctions. In the case of a limited number of regulative 
rather than constitutive rules, the answer is affirmative. These rules are 
regulative in the sense that the posited choice among rules presupposes 
shared language as well as a prevailing more fundamental set of rules. 
Insofar as the origins of language or of the more fundamental constitu-
tive rules of a group or society are concerned, the answer is negative, 
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or at least that is the argument of this paper. 31 Section III begins by 
considering the choice of certain kinds of regulative rules, which corre-
spond to solutions of games of coordination. It concludes with a dis-
cussion of the limitations of coordination game models with respect to 
the explanation of the origin of language. Section IV considers why the 
explanatory program that, in principle, works for problems of coordi-
nation does not work for the explanation of the choice of more funda-
mental constitutive rules (even assuming shared language). 
III. Games of Coordination and Regulative Rules That Solve Them 
Suppose a group has a basic shared language but is trying to reach 
agreement on a set of linguistic symbols to correspond to a set of newly 
encountered phenomena. The problem of selecting such a set of rules 
of communication is formally analogous to a problem popularized by 
Thomas Schelling: 32 Suppose two individuals wish to meet in New 
York. They do not care where they meet but care greatly that they do 
in fact meet. Assuming only three possible meeting places in New 
York, each has to choose one of these as his or her destination. The 
situation has a payoff matrix corresponding to figure I. 
Any combination of a row choice and column choice can be 
thought of as a rule organizing the behavior of these two individuals. 
These rules are regulative, not constitutive, in the sense that the struc-
ture of the problem presupposes the existence of a stable civil society 
(i.e., shared language and agreement on fundamental rules). In this 
case there are nine possible regulative rules, three of which (the on-
diagonal elements of the matrix) are Pareto superior to any of the other 







1 0 0 
1 0 0 
0 1 0 
0 1 0 
0 0 1 
0 0 1 
FIG. I 
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ated with payoffs that make both parties better off than they would be 
under an off-diagonal rule. Once established, any one of these three 
"efficient" rules presents no incentive to either party to try to create a 
new rule. There is unfortunately no guarantee that the parties will 
arrive easily, in the absence of preplay communication, at a rule corre-
sponding to a diagonal element. This is a pure problem of coordination 
in a game which involves no real conflict of interest. The problem was 
"solved" (by Schelling) by appeal to a process of socialization under-
gone by both individuals, which suggested to each of them that the 
most obvious place to meet (perhaps) was the information booth at 
Grand Central Station. 33 
Some problems with basically the same formal structure are such 
questions as what gauge our railroads should have; what side of the 
road one should drive on; what sublanguages, including computer lan-
guages, one should use; where the keys on the typewriter should be 
located; what system for broadcasting and receiving color television 
signals should be employed; what our standards of weights and mea-
sures should be (metric or otherwise); how large one should make the 
computer card;34 what international standard there should be for audio 
and video cassettes, video discs; and so on. The actual problems of 
choice among regulative rules are frequently complicated by the fact 
that they emerge over time, that they do not always involve identical 
benefits to all parties, and that there is sometimes sunk physical and 
human capital associated with one or more of the options. But this 
capital in principle can be included in a social calculus by giving it a 
definite valuation, at least in terms of current replacement costs, and 
therefore differs from the invested "capital" that may appear to be 
associated with the resolution of more fundamental problems, as will 
become apparent in the next section. 
This analysis of rules of coordination seems to offer some support 
for the proposition that those rule structures that now prevail do so 
because they are efficient. The prevalence of certain rules rather than 
others can be explained by reference to their consequences. The rules 
associated with the three on-diagonal elements in figure 1 are efficient 
in comparison with those associated with the off-diagonal elements. 
Suppose in the Schelling problem that the two individuals are not indif-
ferent about which of the three places they meet at: Grand Central 
Station was in fact preferred to Lincoln Center or the Empire State 
Building, because the two travelers intended to continue together by 
train. However, because they had met elsewhere in the past, each 
could not be sure the other would go to the train station: they were still 
faced with a dilemma. One can examine this new situation by consider-
ing a payoff matrix similar to figure 1, but where the R 2C2 payoff has 
been changed to (3, 3). 
This is still a pure game of cooperation-where the term does not 
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mean that this is necessarily a cooperative game in which communica-
tion between the agents is possible and binding contracts can be made, 
but rather that in any given cell, payoffs to the two agents are equal. 
(These two uses of similar terms must be carefully distinguished.) 
N everthless, as compared with the situation described in figure 1, the 
R2C2 choice is now clearly the optimal rule. Imagine that one observes 
that a rule yielding the R2C2 choice prevails. (Note that one could as 
well be talking about railway gauges or computer languages as meeting 
places.) Then, according to a neoclassical institutional economist,35 
who wants to make rule selection and changes endogenous, the expla-
nation for why one observes this rule is that it had been selected as if a 
social maximizer had considered all nine possible rules and had chosen 
the Pareto-superior one. Recognizing that it is costly to change estab-
lished patterns, especially if they are embodied in human and physical 
capital (i.e., the cases of metric conversion, railway gauges, etc.), it 
does not seem totally unreasonable to hypothesize that in the long run 
political processes would arise to solve problems of this sort by creat-
ing channels of communication and permitting coordination. Indeed, 
one might define the presence or absence of a political process accord-
ing to whether or not communication is permitted among the agents. 
Another way of saying that a political process is likely, in the long run, 
to solve pure problems of coordination is that the R2C2 rule is the one 
that the agents would quickly arrive at if they were able to communi-
cate. 
In the absence of communication, however, there is no automatic 
mechanism to get one from R 1C1 or R 3C3 to R2C2 • Both parties would 
obviously prefer to be at the latter point, but may hesitate before 
abandoning a traditional solution for fear that they will end up in one of 
the off-diagonal (0, 0) situations. But when the benefits of a new stan-
dard, meeting place, or railway gauge exceed those of the current 
outcome by a margin larger than the cost of conversion, including losses 
due to equipment or training made unusable by the conversion, then it 
does not seem totally unreasonable to search for (or indeed create, if 
one is in a policymaking position) a political process establishing com-
munication and coordination of the move so as to avoid the losses 
associated with an off-diagonal situation. Solutions to such problems 
require a somewhat more interventionist auctioneer than Walras 
described, one who must not only announce price vectors and total 
orders but also promulgate additional regulative rules, but it is not 
unreasonable to assume that a political process could solve such prob-
lems easily and predictably (especially if compensation can be paid). 
The presence or absence of communication is obviously central to 
the solution of coordination problems, which are problems of establish-
ing conventions. Both the Edgeworth "cooperative" and the Walra-
sian "noncooperative" versions of the competitive economy also pre-
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suppose the ability of agents to communicate-the former in order that 
they may negotiate trades, and the latter so that they may understand 
the meaning of the price vectors cries au hasard by Walras's auc-
tioneer. Language is perhaps the most pervasive example of a set of 
rules organizing interaction (in this case communication) between indi-
viduals. To what extent can language itself be viewed as the outcome 
of a game of coordination in which conventions are established? Con-
sideration of the problem of infinite regress warrants pessimism about 
such inquiries. 
The most serious difficulty with this approach is the lack of expla-
nation for the language that negotiators could use in establishing these 
conventions. In an amusing but important foreword to David Lewis's 
book on Convention, W. V. 0. Quine recollects how he originally 
conceived of it: "When I was a child I pictured our language as settled 
and passed down by a board of syndics, seated in grave convention 
along a table in the style of Rembrandt. The picture remained for a 
while undisturbed by the question what language the syndics might 
have used in their deliberations, or by dread of vicious regress. " 36 
Quine alludes here to his eventual rejection of the proposition that 
the rules of language could be understood as if they originated in con-
ventions: as Lewis puts it, Quine concluded that "our use of language 
conforms to regularities-but no more.' '37 
Although one can posit, following Noam Chomsky, that all human 
beings are born with the genetic capability for mastering the syntax of a 
language, the rules of any specific language are transmitted culturally 
from generation to generation as part of the process of socialization: 
individuals do not rely on a process of negotiation or market interac-
tion to ensure that each new generation in a particular region grows up 
speaking a similar language. Moreover, historical evidence suggests 
that linguistic traditions demonstrate remarkable powers of persis-
tence. The explanations for why people in certain wards of Manchester, 
New Hampshire, or towns in Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, speak French 
at home rather than English reflect accidents of history and culture 
rather than rational responses to different resource endowments or 
technological problems from those faced by their English-speaking 
neighbors. Although some languages are slightly more flexible in deal-
ing with certain types of communication than others, in general any 
number of languages can satisfactorily provide a medium of communi-
cation, provided all members of the relevant group know them. 
Whereas it is true that among sets of possible regulative rules designed 
to solve problems of coordination, efficient ones tend to persist, it is 
not true that the specific character of a language itself can be explained 
in the same fashion. A shared basic language is a prerequisite, not an 
outcome, of the establishment of such conventions. 
The rules dealt with in the first part of this section were regulative. 
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The structure of these problems presupposed the existence of shared 
language and an otherwise stable, functioning social order. But if the 
choice among these rule sets can in principle be explained using these 
techniques, is it not possible that the research program can be ex-
tended to explain choice among more fundamental rules and, in the 
limit, all rule and institutional structures? Doubts have already been 
raised about the possibility of explaining the origin of language along 
such lines. Suppose, however, shared language is taken as given. If it 
were true that political processes arose and operated solely to deal with 
problems of coordination, then the research program suggested by a 
neoclassical approach to institutional economics might be quite prom-
ising. But to assume that this is true is to assume away most of the 
important problems of political, economic, and social organization. 
Coordination problems correspond to games of pure cooperation,38 and 
only a limited subset of social rules are designed to solve problems of 
coordination. As soon as one considers the origin and persistence of 
rules that provide guarantees against the use of force and fraud, thus 
providing an environment in which individuals are capable of (and 
willing voluntarily to enter into) binding contracts, one faces situations 
where "socially desirable" outcomes are not stable (i.e., there are 
strong individual incentives to rule violation and thereby rule break-
down). In these cases the explanatory program associated with neo-
classical institutional economics runs into obstacles that are probably 
insurmountable. 
IV. Prisoner's Dilemma Rules versus Coordination Rules 
The so-called Prisoner's Dilemma has received so much attention that 
it has almost become a cliche. Cliche or not, the dilemma has not in 
any way been attenuated by game theorists' familiarity with it. The 
standard example involves two prisoners39 (perhaps freedom fighters in 
a just war) who are faced with the following choices by their captors: if 
they both confess, they are each sentenced to 5 years in jail; if they 
both refuse to confess, they are sentenced to 1 year; but if one turns 
state's evidence and the other does not, the squealer goes free and the 
other is executed. This creates a payoff matrix in the two-person case 
which can be represented by figure 2. 
What is immediately apparent is that the outcome best for both 
individuals considered together (the upper left) is not the best for each 
prisoner considered individually. Moreover, as each prisoner consid-
ers the options, he realizes that regardless of what the other decides to 
do, he will be individually better off choosing the squealer strategy. 
Unless imbued with very strong norms of solidarity, then, the two 
prisoners end up in the R2C2 situation, in spite of the fact that ex post 
each prisoner would have been better off individually in two of the 
remaining outcomes. The problem here is that the presence or absence 







of preplay communication makes absolutely no difference in the struc-
ture of the problem: the temptation to cheat on an agreement appar-
ently makes the game with communication degenerate into exactly the 
same game that exists without it. 
The Prisoner's Dilemma, although it can describe a situation 
within an established social context, is relevant more generally as a 
metaphor for the fundamental problem of civil society: How does one 
escape from the Hobbesian state of nature? Since the fundamental 
rules which prevent such a war of all against all from developing are 
among those termed the constitutive rules of society in this paper, it is 
important to ask whether the emergence of or choice among such rules 
can be understood as resulting from the actions of freely choosing self-
interested individuals unconstrained by such rules. Option 1 can be 
interpreted as disarming oneself in the expectation that one's oppo-
nents will do likewise, trusting others or, in general, letting down one's 
guard. 
There are several ways to "solve" the Prisoner's Dilemma analyt-
ically, depending on which outcome one wishes to rationalize. One 
"solution" is to recognize that self-interest drives each player to a 
betrayal-because betrayal is the dominant strategy for each player in 
the single-play case (R2C2 is a minimax Nash equilibrium)40-throw up 
one's hands, and conclude on theoretical a priori grounds that a non-
betrayal outcome is impossible. But this is a troubling solution, since 
one in fact frequently does observe mutual nonbetrayal (R1C1 behav-
ior). Another solution is to impose externally a norm of solidarity that 
permits the agents to reach the upper-left-hand outcome. A solution 
with equivalent consequences would be to assume that the players are 
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pure altruists, each concerned only with maximizing the welfare of the 
other. Observing that if one keeps quiet, the other player will be better 
off no matter which course he chooses, both players keep quiet and 
end up with the upper-left-hand outcome. This "explains" nonbetrayal 
but violates the principles of methodological individualism as defined 
here; thus it is shunned by many game theorists. 
Another strategy commonly pursued by game theorists is to as-
sume that the game is repeated, creating what is called a supergame. 
One effort in this direction, cast within the framework of some of 
the political problems discussed in the essay, is found in Michael Tay-
lor's Anarchy and Cooperation. 41 Taylor assumes, as does this paper, 
that the Prisoner's Dilemma is a useful metaphor for the Hobbesian 
state of war. He then assumes that an individual in the state of nature is 
in a supergame: Taylor assumes not only that the state of nature can be 
conceived of as a repeated game, but that it can be viewed as a game 
repeated infinitely. If it were repeated a finite number of times, a domi-
nant strategy would obviously be to betray on the last play. Since one 
could predict the outcome on the last play, the same logic would apply 
to the penultimate play, and so on, until one reached the conclusion 
that betrayal was the dominant strategy for all plays. In other words, 
turning the Prisoner's Dilemma problem into a finitely repeated game 
does not change the nature of the dilemma: the dilemma in each itera-
tion of a series is exactly what it would be in an isolated single play 
game. Luce and Raiffa recognized this logic but still felt it would be 
"reasonable" in the finite-play case to choose strategy 1 in an attempt 
to "teach" one's opponent not to defect, responding to defections with 
"punishments" in the form of one's own defections. This gets to the 
heart of what is meant by ''reasonable,'' but their argument as it stands 
is tortuous and ultimately unconvincing, and most subsequent writers, 
including Taylor, do not accept it.42 
By assuming an infinitely repeated game and, at least in chap. 3, 
exponential discounting of payoffs, Taylor is able to show that there 
exist other pairs of equilibrium strategies (in the sense that once estab-
lished, neither player has an incentive to deviate) besides the strategy 
pair where each player betrays continually.43 Taylor is not primarily 
concerned with the problem of methodological individualism, but 
rather with the justification or lack thereof for a coercive state.44 He 
does not limit himself to the case where individuals are assumed to be, 
as he puts it, purely egoistic. The central part of his analysis (chap. 3), 
however, is conducted under this assumption, including the demon-
stration that under the aforementioned conditions individuals acting 
purely egoistically could attain outcomes other than continuous be-
trayal. 
Can this explanation account for nonbetrayal outcomes and at the 
same time preserve the principles of methodological individualism? By 
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assuming that a state of nature can be represented by an infinitely 
repeated game, Taylor has already assumed an overall structure of 
rudimentary nonbetrayal interaction. There is no a priori reason for 
assuming that a Prisoner's Dilemma game in a state of nature is re-
peated, let alone infinitely repeated. If one lays down one's guns in 
pursuit of a nonbetrayal outcome and is annihilated by one's devious 
opponent, there is no replay. Taylor must implicitly presume some sort 
of legal or customary structure that prevents his players from exiting 
prematurely from the series of plays. This seems to be the fundamental 
difficulty with efforts (by no means limited to Taylor's work) to derive 
nonbetrayal outcomes as the result of a series of "noncooperative" 
games and thereby to claim to have explained cooperation without the 
aid of the ad hoc assumptions associated with a "cooperative" game. 
The specific game-theoretic meaning of "noncooperative" must al-
ways be kept in mind when using this term. "Noncooperative" games 
are not played without rules. 
The Prisoner's Dilemma payoff matrix characterizes a great many 
situations in which a group ( or two people) are jointly better off under a 
rule organizing their behavior that nevertheless leaves great tempta-
tions for rule violations. On some campuses in the United States a 
bicycle can be left unguarded and unlocked and still be retrieved: on 
others this is a certain prelude to a visit with one's insurance agent. If 
members of a group agree not to steal each others' bicycles, they all 
save the real resources that would othewise be used to purchase locks 
and chains. But there is a clear incentive (especially ifno police force is 
provided) for each and every individual publicly to support the agree-
ment and privately to appropriate bikes when they need them. If more 
than a few yield to this temptation, the agreement breaks down, and 
the upper-left-hand solution (no chains, no thefts) degenerates into the 
lower-right-hand solution (chains, no thefts). 
Much of our legal system has evolved in order to deal with prob-
lems of this sort, and although enforcement expenditures generally 
accompany rules where there are incentives to violation, the mainte-
nance of the nonstealing outcome relies to a great extent on the willing-
ness of a sufficiently large fraction of the population to forgo the temp-
tations of immediate gain. An individual may be willing to do this if he 
has confidence that a sufficiently large fraction of the rest of the popu-
lation will act in the same fashion. Similarly, the Internal Revenue 
Service relies on intimidation and fines to ensure that taxes will be 
paid, but as their literature points out again and again, the fundamental 
basis of the system is voluntary compliance. One final example is from 
the realm of foreign affairs. In 1929, Secretary of State Henry L. Stim-
son unilaterally closed the joint State Department-War Department 
Cipher Bureau, explaining that "gentlemen do not read each other's 
mail," and believing that mutual trust was the best route to world 
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peace.45 Was Stimson a courageous diplomat or a naive fool? Can a 
response to this question be made simply on the basis of the analytical 
structure of the situation? 
In a Prisoner's Dilemma situation, even assuming ability to com-
municate, there can be no presumption that negotiation or a "political 
process" will get the parties to a nonbetrayal solution. First of all, the 
socially desirable situation (socially desirable in the bicycle case, if not 
the Prisoner case) is not Pareto superior. As compared with either of 
the off-diagonal elements, it makes one party much better off at the 
expense of another who is made a little worse off. There is absolutely 
no theoretical presumption based on the behavioral assumption of 
strict pursuit of self-interest that the political process will succeed in 
establishing and maintaining an R 1C1 rule: the social stability resulting 
from widespread acceptance of norms against theft or physically harm-
ing others is always precarious, always subject to disturbance, always 
subject to the risk that a large number of people in the relevant popula-
tion will decide to go for short-run gains. Clearly, when all do so and 
the stability breaks down, they are all worse off. But how does one 
respond to what one might call the Yossarian argument? In Catch 22, 
an associate begrudges the protagonist his unwillingness to fly combat 
missions by asking what would happen if everyone felt that way. Y os-
sarian replies that in that case he would "certainly be a damn fool to 
feel any other way. " 46 
The logical and moral problems created by situations of this type 
would be more amusing were they not so serious. For example, it is 
commonly argued that one ought to pay taxes because if no one paid, 
all would suffer. This type of argument by generalization (one should 
not do a, because if all did a, it would be disastrous) is however not 
always valid, as can be seen by substituting "not be an economist" for 
"pay taxes." The argument that one should not be an economist, 
because if everyone were an economist we would have nothing to eat, 
is not a valid argument against joining the profession (although there 
may be others). Furthermore, the argument in favor of paying taxes is 
subject to devastating rebuttals, especially if they are used in tandem. 
First, one can argue that since everyone is going to pay, no one will be 
the wiser if one cheats. If this argument does not work, one can come 
back with, "Since no one would be fool enough to pay their taxes, 
disaster will arrive anyway, and you don't expect me to be a sucker, do 
you?" 47 Philosophers have wrestled with these normative problems 
with varying degrees of success, without being able to resolve them. 
This lack of resolution, in a sense, mirrors the positive indeterminacy 
of Prisoner's Dilemma outcomes. 
Historically, some level of enforcement expenditure (if only to 
convince those willing to abide by the rule if others do that they will not 
be suckers) has usually been required to ensure tolerable levels of 
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compliance. The problem for the research program set forth by neo-
classical institutional economists is that the enforcement costs associ-
ated with maintaining a tolerable level of compliance may not be inde-
pendent of the length of time a rule has been in place, although the 
functional form relating enforcement costs to rule longevity is not obvi-
ous on a priori grounds. In the limit, enforcement costs may drop to 
zero, and the weight of tradition, through a process understood only 
imperfectly, may make it simply unthinkable for any agent to violate 
the current practice, in spite of individual incentives to do so. 
Suppose one is willing to assume, without explanation, the exis-
tence of shared language and of a political process capable of scanning 
actual and potential organizational blueprints in search of the most 
"efficient" one. Such a scan could be done on the basis of Benthamite 
utilitarian principles, with interpersonal comparisons of utility; or it 
could be done by a Pareto optimizer who respects utility levels associ-
ated with some initial resource distributions, or by a Kaldor-Hicks 
compensator, whether or not he actually pays compensation. Such a 
political scanner ought in principle to be able to solve regulative prob-
lems involving games of coordination. Regardless of which of these (or 
other) algorithms is used, however, such a program will confront a 
very serious difficulty when applied to the selection of more fundamen-
tal rules. Such rules govern Prisoner's Dilemma-like situations and 
frequently require expenditures on enforcement to ensure that R1C1 
behavior does not degenerate into the more stable R2C2 outcomes. To 
the extent that the political scanner does not know these costs, his 
attempt to select efficient rules will break down, because the true indi-
vidual payouts associated with various rules under consideration are 
net of enforcement costs; and without known enforcement costs, one 
does not know the true payout vector. Deductive logic does not point 
the way toward knowledge of these costs: a priori theorizing provides 
no obvious method for assigning probabilities to various levels of en-
forcement costs. One might be able to assign such probabilities using 
historical data, but such procedures are inductive and would raise 
difficulties for those who wish to obtain results using strictly a priori 
theorizing. What deductive foundation would there be for the persis-
tence of these probabilities? 
The cultural or historical conditions that may make it possible to 
sustain R 1C1 behavior with relatively low real expenditures on enforce-
ment can be thought of as invested "capital" associated with the exist-
ing institutional arrangements. But this "capital" differs from the capi-
tal associated, for example, with a narrow-gauge railway in one part of 
the country, which may have to be torn up and replaced if a different 
gauge is adopted nationwide. The difference is that one can, given 
technical or engineering data on the costs of extracting and transform-
ing raw materials, calculate the approximate replacement cost of the 
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junked tracks and compare this with what would have to be junked if 
another gauge were at some time adopted universally. There is no 
obvious way either analytically or with engineering data to calculate 
the "replacement" cost of the "capital" associated with the more 
fundamental rule structures now under consideration. The technology 
of reconstructing credibility, expectations about future behavior, or 
more generally, political legitimacy, depends not on predictable physi-
cal relationships but on the much less predictable human propensities 
to forget, to trust, to cooperate. A state of mutual trust is not therefore 
a commodity, like a locomotive, that can easily be given a market 
valuation approximating its cost of construction or replacement. 
For example, imagine that as the result of institutional innovation 
or a change in the resource or technological environment, a new or-
ganizational option became available-an option which, if it could be 
established as a new rule structure with no increase over current levels 
of enforcement costs, would be Pareto superior (preferred or tolerated 
by all parties) to current practice. Is there any presumption that the 
political process will operate so as to get one to this new position? 
Conservatives might with good reason suspect that, in reality, a rise in 
enforcement costs over current levels would be necessary to maintain 
this newly introduced regime in the context of the disruptions of the 
changeover, more than wiping out any apparent advantage. Radicals 
might argue that one could rapidly establish a new "stable order" and 
move to the level where the original (or even lower) levels of enforce-
ment expenditures were necessary. There is no a priori means of decid-
ing between the conservative and radical arguments; and there is there-
fore no presumption that the political process would necessarily 
operate so as to select the most "efficient" rule where elements of 
conflict exist potentially, because the true payouts associated with the 
rule depend on knowledge of its enforcement or overhead costs. Such 
costs may be influenced by longevity of rules; then again they may not: 
the functional form relating costs to longevity cannot be determined 
using deductive logic alone. 
When considering fundamental constitutive rules, the posited 
political institution scanner could not be assumed to select "efficient 
rules," because the true payout vector in these cases could not be 
known with certainty. This is not necessarily a matter of different 
attitudes toward risk. Differences between conservatives and radicals, 
to the extent that they frame their arguments in terms of the good of the 
collectivity-generally a prerequisite for political discourse-may 
reflect substantial differences in the perception of uncertain net payoff 
matrices even in cases where there are no differences in risk prefer-
ences. In order to make such a scan theoretically feasible, one would 
have to assume invariance of "rule abidance willingness" with respect 
to potential changes in rules. Having made this final assumption, along 
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with the assumptions of shared language and a basic political 
framework, one would find that what began as an attempt to defend the 
more ambitious second position outlined at the start of this essay, had 
arrived, through a slow process of attrition, at the first position. 
Game theorists sometimes become so enamored of the mechanics 
of the theory and the single-minded determination of their players to 
win that they lose sight of what any game-theoretic problem presup-
poses: the arena in which the players are to compete or cooperate. To 
give a striking example: von Neumann and Morgenstern demonstrated 
that it is theoretically possible to develop for the game of chess, as for 
checkers and other games of perfect information, a theory that would 
predict what actions a rational opponent interested in winning would 
undertake given the layout of the board and the next move one 
makes. 48 But one will not obtain, nor does one expect to obtain from 
such a theory, an explanation for why knights move in an L-shaped 
pattern or bishops move diagonally. Similarly, although one can inves-
tigate with game theory the dilemmas possibly faced by two prisoners, 
one should not expect from such a theory an explanation for why 
escape or insurrection is not part of the strategy space. As has been 
argued, the arena of any interactive game is partly determined by re-
sources and technologies, but the social norms that pervade the atmo-
sphere are an equally important characteristic of that arena. A Prison-
er's Dilemma game where the players are imbued with a strong norm of 
solidarity may have a different outcome from one where this is lacking 
The same may be said for a game where the guards share the political 
objectives of the captives. Even war, on the face of it a complete 
breakdown of international norms or rules, is in fact conducted accord-
ing to highly elaborated rules and conventions. Few responsible mili-
tary personnel maintain that all is fair in war: 49 constraints on accept-
able military action are an integral part of most military training. 
V. Conclusions 
The question whether such concepts as norms can in principle be com-
pletely dispensed with (by reducing them to some logically prior round 
of individual interaction in which appeal to norms or normlike concepts 
is not made) is an important one, too important indeed for economists 
to remain agnostic about. Some practitioners of microeconomic analy-
sis answer this question unhesitatingly in the affirmative. Many others 
remain somewhat skeptical, although basically sympathetic: the 
thought that with further development the techniques of game-
theoretical analysis will lead us in this direction is a comforting one. 
Economists have frequently been hostile to structuralist explana-
tions, and this essay is not intended as support for an extreme struc-
turalist view of the world, in which agents lack free will and dangle like 
marionettes on strings connected to structures deeply embedded in 
704 Economic Development and Cultural Change 
history, culture, or genetics. But the legitimacy of the concept itself 
cannot be gainsaid (although one may, if one desires, view these struc-
tures as continually and voluntarily reaffirmed, generation after gener-
ation). Their effect at the individual level is to define the range and 
nature of options treated by the individual as legitimate in considering 
ways to improve his individual welfare and, residually, those which are 
not. Those options excluded in principle (murder, theft, kidnapping, 
blackmail, etc.) clearly constrain individual action. The range of ex-
cluded options and thus the severity of these constraints may vary 
across time and space, but so long as civil society persists, this con-
straining influence never disappears entirely; and so long as social 
stability is desired, one will not wish that it do so. In any society not all 
individuals respect all these exclusions, but a sufficiently large number 
do to make stable social interactions possible. 
If one maintains that norms or rules logically antedate markets 
(and indeed situations of strategic interaction), then one must pay close 
attention to the historical, legal, or cultural evolution of the situation 
under study. Recognizing that norms need to be analyzed in their own 
right, using extraeconomic and often case-specific methods, one can 
redefine microeconomic analysis as the analysis of the results of behav-
ior by self-interested agents acting within constraints determined in 
part by technologies, resources, and the preference of others, but also 
in part by the systems of rules or norms confronted (in the sense that 
they constrain the behavior of others) or participated in (in the sense 
that they influence individual behavior irrespective of others' behav-
ior). Any outcomes predicted or explained by such behavioral models 
are as conditional on the specified "social restraints" (norms) as they 
are on the other more commonly specified categories of exogenous 
variables. 
Given shared language and other fundamental rules, the tech-
niques of game theory do provide a framework for understanding how, 
in the case of a limited set of regulative rules, a political process might 
select from a group of possible rules or norms those which are most 
efficient. This technique does not, unfortunately, work for the explana-
tion of the origin of those fundamental rules ( or the origin of language). 
If one defines rational behavior as the selection of appropriate means 
for the achievement of desired ends, and defines these ends strictly in 
terms of the interests of the individual who is selecting these ends, one 
reaches the conclusion that all organized social activity presupposes 
behavior on the part of individuals that could easily be stigmatized as 
nonrational, if not irrational, according to this definition. Why, after 
all, should the individual, so careful about calculating individual gains 
as affected by variations in what he sees as legitimate options, be so 
willing to accept a certain range of other options as illegitimate when he 
has no real guarantee that others will continue to do so? How came he 
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to accept these in the first place? This paper has argued that it is 
impossible to understand such behavior as resulting from rational 
means-individual end calculations without first assuming a set of logi-
cally anterior rules, norms, or excluded options. 
Utilitarianism and the methodological individualism frequently as-
sociated with it have historically performed yeoman service in calling 
into question various established institutions and procedures. But its 
weakness had been the problem of order. This paper has argued that in 
order to maintain analytically an arena of human choice in which 
means-end type calculations can legitimately be assumed to prevail, 
one must assume a complementary range of options that are ruled out 
of consideration by individuals, in spite of the fact that means-end 
calculations would suggest to them opportunities for individual gain 
from doing otherwise. For any historical situation, the delineation of 
that arena is a tricky but essential business, and it cannot be done on 
the basis of first principles. The recognition of boundaries beyond 
which means-end calculations cannot reasonably (and should not) be 
assumed to prevail is the intellectual price that must be paid for pre-
serving an arena in which they can. 
The inscription "Obedience to Law is Liberty" is emblazoned 
over the Main Street courthouse in Worcester, Massachusetts. This 
fundamentally conservative sentiment, expressed though it is in terms 
some would find overbearing, nevertheless embodies a truth about 
the persistence of all stable social orders: norms established through 
the process of socialization, perhaps "voluntarily" accepted or 
affirmed, perhaps building on certain genetic predispositions, provide 
part of the framework within which individuals pursue their self-
interests. Intellectually defensible microeconomic analysis, in its com-
petitive or game-theoretic variant, can be undertaken only if this prin-
ciple is recognized; the refusal to recognize it leaves one with no 
satisfactory explanation for why the world does not degenerate into a 
war of all against all. As a positive statement about the operation of the 
real world and the tasks of social science, this proposition is 
straightforward enough. This having been said, it remains true that 
there are many solutions to problems of order, and this paper has only 
touched upon the normative problems associated with evaluating, ac-
cording to a standard yet to be agreed upon, various possible rules and 
acts. 50 
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1. The term "norm" is used here in a restricted sense to refer to legal, 
cultural, or conventional rules regulating interaction between individuals. Soci-
ologists and anthropologists sometimes use a broader definition, e.g., when 
they speak of consumption norms. Such behavior-influencing variables in-
fluence interactions between persons and things and, following standard eco-
nomic usage, can more appropriately be termed preferences. Admittedly the 
distinction is not hard and fast and may be difficult to operationalize, since 
exhibition of certain consumption behavior may represent willingness to 
abide by the rules of a group or subgroup. See also n. 27. 
2. For a detailed discussion of the promise and achievement of work along 
these lines by Richard Posner, Douglass North, and Robert Paul Thomas, see 
Alexander J. Field, "The Problem with Neoclassical Institutional Economics: 
A Critique with Special Reference to the North-Thomas Model of Pre-1500 
Europe," Explorations in Economic History 18 (April 1981): 174-98. 
3. "Extreme" in the sense that all rules, including the most fundamental, 
are to be explained in this fashion. Section III of this paper argues that the 
emergence and persistence of a limited number of regulative rules can be 
explained as if they had been selected as the result of some sort of maximizing 
process, assuming the existence of shared language and a stable political and 
social order within which these choices are made. 
4. For an example, consider any number of articles in the optimal tax 
literature, where individuals may vary their supply of inputs in response to tax 
changes, but compliance rates are assumed invariant to policy changes. 
5. The term "methodological individualism" is used here to refer to mod-
els (a) where individuals are concerned with their own individual interest and 
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